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NAURU V. AUSTRALIA
I. INTRODUCTION

On August 10, 1993, the Republic of Nauru' and the Commonwealth
of Australia settled their historic lawsuit in which Nauru sought
reparations for the rehabilitation of the island's once-rich phosphate
producing lands.2 The case, Certain PhosphateLands in Nauru (Nauru
v. Australia),3 was the first in which a former trust territory sought redress
from a former trusteeship authority for the administration of the territory's
economic assets. 4 The dispute raised interesting questions of international
law concerning accountability for the operations and conduct in a trust
territory. Although the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") did not get
the opportunity to decide the merits of the case, the dispute and its
subsequent settlement stand as convincing evidence that a fiduciary duty
exists in international law.
Nauru's claims5 arose from the mining of its phosphate deposits6 by
the British Phosphate Commissioners ("Commissioners") 7 during the
1. The Republic of Nauru is a small island nation in the southwestern Pacific Ocean.
For a more complete geographic, demographic, and political discussion of Nauru, see
infra part II.A-C.
2. Australia-Republic of Nauru: Settlement of the Case in the International Court of
Justice Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Aug. 10, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1471
[hereinafter Settlement Agreement]. The settlement was entered into force on August 20,
1993. Id. at 1471.
3. 1992 I.C.J. 240 (June 26) (Preliminary Objections, Judgment) [hereinafter
Preliminary Objections, Judgment].
4. See Keith Highet, The PeacePalace Heats Up: The World Court in Business Again,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 646, 651 (1992). There have been a few cases concerning a trustee's
failure to fulfill its duty to move a non-self-governing territory to full independence. See,
e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J.
16 (Jan. 26); Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15 (Dec. 2).
5. See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1989 I.C.J. 4 (May 19)
[hereinafter Nauru Application].
6. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
7. The British Phosphate Commissioners was a nonprofit corporation established by
the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand while Nauru was under the League of
Nations Mandate System. See U.N. TCOR, 24th Sess., Agenda Item 3(d), at 1, U.N.
Doc. T/1466 (1959). The Commissioners was given the authority to work, manage, and
sell the phosphate deposits of Nauru. See U.N. TCOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 2-3,
U.N. Doc. T/898 (1951). The three governments gave the exclusive right to mine
phosphate to the Commissioners and bound themselves from interfering in the Nauruan
phosphate industry. Subsequently, the Commissioners had full administrative and
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period of the island's trusteeship! The claims were based primarily on
Australia's alleged violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Trusteeship
Agreement for the Territory of Nauru ("Trusteeship Agreement"), 9 and
Article 76 of the United Nations Charter ("Charter"). 1 Nauru also
claimed that Australia violated several principles of general international
law when it allowed the island's phosphate deposits to be mined to a point
of near-depletion, and when it allowed the benefit of the phosphate
industry to be shared by the three administering authorities rather than the
Nauruan people. 1
Although Australia's counter-memorial has not been made public, 2
it is not difficult to discern Australia's specific opposition to Nauru's
claims. First, as a preliminary matter, Australia contended that Nauru's
claims were inadmissible as a matter of international law and that Nauru
had waived any claims to rehabilitation of the phosphate lands. In
legislative authority concerning the phosphate industry. In accordance with a trilateral
agreement made on February 9, 1987, the overseas assets of the Commissioners were
divided between the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. For a full discussion
of the history of the Commissioners and how it came to control Nauruan phosphate, see
Ellen M. FitzGerald, Note, Nauru v. Australia: A Sacred Trust Betrayed?, 6 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 209 (1990).

8. For a discussion of Nauru's trusteeship, see infra notes 40-82 and accompanying
text.
9. Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru, Nov. 1, 1947, Nauru-Austl.N.Z.-U.K., 10 U.N.T.S. 3, 6, 8 [hereinafter Trusteeship Agreement].
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 76; Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 243.
11. In particular, Nauru claimed that Australia breached the following obligations:
1. the international standards generally recognized as applicable in the
impleeuta'oii of the printciple of self-determu'atioQ;
2.
the obligation to respect the right of the Nauruan people to permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources;
the obligation of general international law not to exercise powers of
3.
administration in such a way as to produce a denial of justice lato sensu;
4. the obligation of general international law not to exercise powers of
administration in such a way as to constitute an abuse of rights; and
5.
the principle of general international law that a State which is responsible
for the administration of a territory is under an obligation not to bring
about changes in the condition of the territory which will cause
irreparable damages to, or substantially prejudice, the existing or
contingent legal interests of another State in respect of that territory.
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 243-44 (paraphrased).
12. According to the rules of the International Court of Justice, counter-memorials are
not made public until the merits phase of the case is reached. See SHABTAI ROSENN,
PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE 1978 RULES OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 104-19 (1983).
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addition, Australia claimed that the suit could not proceed without the
presence of the United Kingdom and New Zealand, and, in any event, that
the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.1 3 Second, and going to the
substance of Nauru's claims, Australia contended that Nauruans enjoyed
a higher standard of living during the period of the mandate and
trusteeship than it had ever experienced previously. 14 Moreover, Australia
claimed that if Nauru's needs were sufficiently provided for, it could
dispose of the remainder of the assets in whatever manner it
desired-Australia could use the residual assets for its own benefit. 15
Although the ICJ did not reach the merits of the case, it rejected six
of Australia's seven preliminary objections concerning the court's
jurisdiction over the matter, the alleged waiver of any claims by Nauru,
and the fact that New Zealand and the United Kingdom were not parties
to the action.' 6 In a unanimous decision, the ICJ did uphold one of
Australia's preliminary objections concerning one of Nauru's claims to the
Australian allocation of the overseas assets of the British Phosphate
Commissioners. 7 However, in a nine to four vote, the ICJ found that,
based on Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court,'I it had jurisdiction to
13. Australia also objected on the grounds that the termination of Nauru's trusteeship
precluded any claims for rehabilitation, the lawsuit was precluded because Nauru had not
submitted it within a reasonable time, and also that the claim was precluded because of
Nauru's alleged lack of good faith. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at
246-55. For a full discussion of Australia's objections, see infra part III.C.
14. See Australian Practice in International Law 1990-1991, 13 AusTR. Y.B. INT.L
195, 410 (Jonathan Brown ed., 1992).
15. See Anthony Anghie, Note, "The HeartofMy Home": Colonialism, Environmental
Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 445, 465 (1993).
16. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 345 (June 29)
(Order) [hereinafter Order of June 29].
17. Id.
18. Article 36(2) states the following:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without any special agreement, in
relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
Court in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation;
(d) the nature of extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 993, 3 Bevins 1179 (entered into force on Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter Statute of the
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entertain Nauru's Application, and the suit was permissible under
international law. 9
This article analyzes the recent settlement of the dispute between
Nauru and Australia. In addition, the article analyzes the decision of the
ICJ in the preliminary objections phase of the case.2 0 More importantly,
it discusses the nature, source, and extent of the fiduciary duty2 in
international law, and whether Australia has breached this duty.
Furthermore, the article argues that had the ICJ reached the merits of the
case, it would have held Australia, as the administering authority of the
trust territory, liable for the breach of its international fiduciary duty in
administering Nauru's economic assets-the island's phosphate deposits.
Part II of the article presents a review of Nauru's social and political
history, including an account of its existence under the League of Nations
Mandate System (."Mandate System") and the United Nations Trusteeship
System ("Trusteeship System"). Part III presents a comprehensive
analysis of the dispute between Nauru and Australia. The section begins
with a discussion of the history of Nauru v. Australia and an analysis of
Nauru's claims for reparations, and continues with a brief description of
Australia's preliminary objections to the ICJ's assertion of jurisdiction
over the dispute and the admissibility of Nauru's claims. The section
further discusses the ICJ's decision of June 26, 1992 in Nauru v.
Australia, which rejected the bulk of Australia's preliminary objections.
The section continues with a brief analysis of Australia's arguments in
opposition to Nauru's substantive claims. Part III concludes with a
presentation and discussion of the settlement of Nauru v. Australia. Part
IV of the article focuses on the search for a fiduciary duty in international
law. The section discusses the nature, source, and extent of the
international fiduciary duty Australia owed to Nauru during the mandate
and trusteeship periods. Part V discusses whether Australia has breached
this international fiduciary duty, and Part VI concludes with a brief
prediction on how the ICJ would have decided the merits phase of the
case.

Court].
19. Order of June 29, supranote 16, at 345. An application to the International Court

of Justice is analogous to a complaint filed in the municipal context. Nauru's Application
was filed on May 19, 1989. Nauru Application, supra note 5.
20. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 240.
21. For a definition of fiduciary duty in this context, see infra notes 254-58 and
accompanying text.
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H. BACKGROUND

An analysis of Nauru's claims for reparations because of Australia's
alleged misconduct must necessarily start with a historical review of the
two nations' relationship. 22 This includes a discussion of Nauru's social
and political history, and its existence under the Mandate System and
Trusteeship System with Australia at the helm.
A. Nauru's History
The Republic of Nauru is an independene 3 island nation located in
southeastern Micronesia.24 The island consists of an uplifted coral
formation of about 21.2 square kilometers, with a central plateau sixty
meters high that is covered with beds of phosphate rock. 25 Below the
plateau is a fertile strip of land ranging from 150 to 300 meters in width.26
This strip contains most of the habitable land on the island, but allows for

22. A historical perspective is relevant not only for a thorough understanding of the
legal issues involved in the case, but also because such discussions are frequently included
in the opinions of the International Court of Justice. See generally Fisheries Case (U.K.
v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf
of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
23. Nauru gained its independence on January 31, 1968. See 1991 BRITANNICA
WORL. DATA 742 (i5thed.). Nauru is currently a special member of the Commonwealth
of Nations, the International Telecommunications Union, the International Civil Aviation
Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and the South Pacific Commission. Id. at 74243.
For an excellent discussion of Nauru and its history, see CHRISTOPHER G.
WEERAMANTRY,

NAURU:

ENVIRONMENTAL

DAMAGE

UNDER

INTERNATIONAL

TRusTEEsHip (1992).
24. Micronesia is a group of approximately 2100 islands located in the southwestern
Pacific Ocean, spread over an area of three million square miles. See 25 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNiCA 232, 253 (15th ed. 1991). Nauru is positioned at 0 degrees, 32 seconds
south latitude and 166 degrees, 56 seconds east latitude, approximately 4050 kilometers
northeast of Sydney, Australia, and 4160 kilometers southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii. Id.
at 281.
25. The plateau is between thirty and sixty meters above sea level. The phosphate rock
is derived from guano deposits. Id. at 282.
26. Michael W. Leslie, Note, InternationalFiduciary Duty: Australia's Trusteeship
Over Nauru, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 397, 398 (1990).
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very limited agricultural production.27 Nauru is encircled by an unbroken
coral reef, which affords the island no usable harbors. 28
Nauru's current population is estimated at 9300, of which three-fifths
are indigenous Nauruans of Micronesian, Melanesian, and Polynesian
descent. 29 One-fourth of the population is comprised of other Pacific
Islanders, while the remainder are of Asian and European descent.30
Again, Nauru's entire population is contentrated along the habitable
coastal strip encircling the plateau."a
Nauru's economy is based almost entirely on the mining, processing,
and exporting of the high quality phosphate deposits found on the central
plateau. 32 The phosphate industry provided Nauru with a Gross National
Product of $160 million (U.S.) in 1988. 3 This allowed Nauruans to
experience a per capita income of about $20,000 (U.S.), which was the
27. 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 562 (15th ed. 1991). Although Nauru's climate
is tropical (daytime temperatures average 28* Celsius), irregular rainfall (2060 mm
axwually and viery partous soil of p4ar quality limits agriculturat produtioe. Id. The
subsistence crops of coconut palms, pandanus (a small palm-like plant yielding fiber used
for weaving), bananas, pineapple, and a few vegetables, cannot support the island's
population. See 25 ENCYCLOPkDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 24, at 282.
28. 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRIT,^NNICA, supra note 27, at 562.

29. This estimate is from 1991. 1991 BRrrANNICA WORLD DATA, supra note 23, at
748. Seventy-seven percent of the population is under the age of 29, and there is an
annual growth rate of 2.1%. Nauruan life expectancy is 64 years of age for men, and 69
for women. Id.
30. 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 27, at 562.

31. Id.
32. Id.; see 25 ENCYCLoPEDIA BRrrANNICA, supra note 24, at 282. The large
deposits of phosphate rock have been formed by the interaction of guano with limestone.
The raw phosphate rock found on the central plateau is unsuitable as fertilizer because it
is relatively insoluble and contains high percentages of fluorine. Therefore, the rock must
be put through a complex process whereby it is treated with chemicals, such as sulfuric
acid, to produce water-soluble compounds such as calcium phosphate, phosphoric acid,
and ammonium phosphate. In their refined state, the phosphates are known as Nauru
Calcined Rock. See Leslie, supra note 26, at 399.
More than 100 million tons of phosphate rock are mined each year throughout the
world. Major producers include the United States, the Russian Federation, and Morocco;
other producers include Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Algeria, and Tunisia. Ninety percent
of the rock is used for the production of phosphate fertilizers. Although phosphate rock
derived from guano deposits, like that found in Nauru, is a minor factor in the world
supply and demand, it is a major source for phosphate fertilizers used in Australia and
New Zealand. Nauru produces about two million tons of phosphates annually, and exports
the finished product to Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Japan. See 21
ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERiCANA 963 (Int'l ed. 1985).
33. 1991 BRITANNICA WORLD DATA, supra note 23, at 772.
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highest in the region, and among the highest in the world.34 However,
this level of income should not be overstated. Assuming constant 1984
production levels, Nauru's phosphate deposits will be completely depleted
by the year 2000. 3' As Nauru relies almost exclusively on phosphate
mining for its livelihood, it will surely experience a difficult economic
situation in the next decade. Agricultural production and commercial
fishing provide the only other industries from which Nauru can produce
income, but neither is sufficient for the island's economic needs. As a
hedge against the inevitable economic decline, the Nauruan government
has invested profits from the phosphate industry in Australian real estate,
a national airline and shipping line, and other long-term enterprises.36
The mining operations on Nauru are coordinated by the Nauru
Phosphate Corporation, an agent of the national government. Fifty percent
of the profits from the mining industry is distributed to the national
government; the other half is divided among Nauruan landowners, a trustfund, and the local government. 37 The income from phosphate mining has
allowed Nauru to build an impressive infrastructure and to afford a high
standard of living to its inhabitants.t However, as was previously stated,
this level of achievement should not be overstated as the island's phosphate
reserves are soon to be completely depleted. 39 The result of the British
Phosphate Commissioners' exclusive mining of the phosphate rock has
been to leave Nauru without adequate resources to provide for the island's
future.
B. Nauru: Pre-mandateto Independence
To properly frame the dispute between Nauru and Australia, it is
necessary to examine their political relationship prior to Nauru's
independence. This is necessary because any duty owed to Nauru must
be based on an obligation arising during the period of Australian control
of the island. Logically, the first place to begin this examination would
appear to be the Nauru Mandate and Trusteeship Agreement, as these

34. Id.

35. See, e.g., WEERAmANrRy, supra note 23, at xiii ("The known phosphate resources
of the island as recorded by the Nauru Phosphate Commission are likely, at present rates
of mining and sales, to run out about 1994.").
36. See, e.g., Lesfit, supra ril 2 6 , at 399-40.
37. 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA, supra note 27, at 562.
38. For a discussion on Nauru's infrastructure, see id.
39. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at xiii.
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documents were the source of Australia's administrative power and as the
ICJ would have been bound to apply international conventions and treaties
first.' However, it is important to know what happened prior to the
Mandate in order to understand the extent to which Nauru's resources had
been controlled by other nations. And, this is the better place to start.
The first European to visit Nauru was Captain John Fearn of the
British ship Hunter, who arfied at the island in 1799 when sailing from
New Zealand to China. 4' Thereafter, Nauru was frequently visited by
whaling ships through the 1830s, which used the island to replenish
supplies. A few sailors even settled on the island.42
Disputes between Australian, British, and German trading companies
operating in the Pacific intensified during the latter half of the nineteenth
century.43 In 1886, the United Kingdom and Germany entered into the
Anglo-German Convention of April 6, 1886, which divided the western
Pacific into separate spheres of influence and Nauru fell within the
German sector. 4 By 1888, German settlers persuaded their government
to incorporate Nauru into the Imperial German Protectorate of the
Marshall Islands.4'
The Nauruan phosphate deposits were discovered in 1899 by an
employee of the Pacific Islands Company, a British trading enterprise. At
that time, a concession was given to Jaliut Gesellschaft, a German
company which started mining the phosphate in 1900. In 1906, the
concession was transferred to the Pacific Phosphate Company, which ran
the mines until 1914.4 During World47 War I, Australia occupied Nauru
and controlled its phosphate industry.
Following World War I, a number of nations including Australia,
New Zealand, and South Africa wanted to replace Germany as the colonial
master of Nauru. The United States, however, was opposed to the

40. See Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 38(1).
41. See 8 ENCYCLOpDiA BRrrANNICA, supra note 27, at 562.
42. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 5.
43. Id.

44. See Nauru Application, supra note 5, at 4.
45. It is claimed that European-supplied firearms contributed to the spread of interclan
warfare from 1878 to 1888, and this led to pressure by the German Settlers. 8
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 27, at 562.
46. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 16-27. Pacific Phosphate was formerly the
Pacific Islands Company. Profits were shared with Jaliut Gesellschaft. For a detailed
discussion of the transfer of the concession, see id.
47. See id. at 41-54.
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annexation of Nauru by any of the Allied Nations.48 Under the direction
of President Woodrow Wilson, the United States lobbied for Nauru to be
provided for by the League of Nations.
Australian Prime Minister Hughes dismissed the United States'
aspirations for the League of Nations as unrealistic. 4 9 Hughes wanted to
annex Nauru for a number of reasons, including garnering the inexpensive
source of high quality phosphate for the Australian agricultural industry
and the desire to ease the country's heartache from losing 60,000
Australians during the war." °
Australia sought support for its position from Great Britain. It
received that support when British Prime Minister Lloyd George endorsed
and advocated a compromise that was ultimately accepted by the United
States.5" Under the compromise, which was concluded at the Versailles
Conference, territories such as Nauru and New Guinea would remain
under the supervision of the League of Nations but would be administered
"under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions" thereof. 2
On December 17, 1920, "His Britannic Majesty" was granted a class
"C" mandate for Nauru pursuant to Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles
and Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. 3 The purpose of the
Mandate was to promote the material wealth and physical well-being 5of4
the people of Nauru and "development for a sacred trust of civilization."
Under this system, "His Majesty" enjoyed a wide scope of power over
Nauru, which it controlled as an "integral portion[ I of its territory."'
However, this type of mandate did not grant the United Kingdom
sovereignty over the mandated territory.5 6
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. See id. at 48; see also NANCY VIVIANI, NAURU: PHOSPHATE AND POLMCAL
PROGRESS 42 (1970).
51. The compromise plan involved the creation of class "A," "B," and "C" mandates.
See infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text; see also WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23,
at 46-47. In order to win Hughes's support, Prime Minister George argued that while the
Mandate System required the protection of certain rights of the inhabitants, the plan
allowed Australia something comparable to ownership of the island. Id. at 47.
52. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.

53. Id.; see also Nauru Application, supra note 5, at 6. For a discussion of the C
mandate, see infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
54. LEAGUE OF NATIoNs COvENANT art. 22.

55. The Covenant stated that the C mandates were best administered under the
domestic laws of the Mandatory power. Id.
56. This was specifically held by the International Court of Justice and other municipal
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Prior to the Nauruan Mandate, an internal struggle occurred among
Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain concerning the actual control
of the island. While Australia was intent on nothing short of complete
control over Nauru, New Zealand, also dependent on an inexpensive
supply of phosphate, desired the same.57 Similarly, Britain desired to
assert its influence over Nauru through the authority already existing in the
region in the form of the High Commissioner of the western Pacific."8
On July 2, 1919, the three nations settled their internal straggle and
entered into the Nauru Island Agreement ("NIA"). 5 9 According to the
NIA's preamble, the agreement was entered into to "make provision[s] for
the exercise of the . . .Mandate and for the mining of the phosphate
deposits on the ...island."' Reference to the mining operations as a
related yet distinct aspect aside from the Mandate indicates the importance
the three governments placed on the phosphate deposits." A great deal of
the NIA was directed at developing a system to extract the phosphate
deposits. Under the NIA, Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain
would share the phosphate. 62
In addition to structuring a system to exploit the phosphate deposits,
the NIA established a system for the island's administration. Australia
was appointed the initial Administrator of Nauru for a five-year period.63
Thereafter, the three governments adopted the practice of allowing
Australia to appoint the succeeding Administrators.' A few years later,
general administration of the island was transferred to the British
Phosphate Commissioners.65
Under the Supplemental Agreement of May 30, 1923, the British
Phosphate Commissioners was given complete control of the phosphate
courts. See International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 132 (July 11);
Rex v. Christian, S. Aft. L. Rep. 101 (App. Div. 1924); Frost V. Stevenson, 58 C.L.R.
528 (Austl. 1937).
57. See Anghie, supra note 15, at 451.
58. Id. (citing

BARmE

MACDONALD,

IN PURSUIT OF THE SACRED

TRUsT 10-11

(1988)).
59. See Agreement between Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand Relative to the
Administration of Nauru Island, July 2, 1919, 225 C.T.S. 431 [hereinafter Nauru Island
Agreement].
60. Id. at pmbl.
61. See generally id. at 431-33.
62. Id. at 433.
63. Id. at 432.
64. See Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9, art. 4.
65. 18 U.N. TCOR, 18th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. T/L.720 (1956).
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industry. 66 Ownership of the phosphate deposits and all related property
was vested in the Commissioners.67 Prior to this vesting, the three
governments paid a royalty to the Nauruan people to gain control over all
previously held title to the deposits and other property. 68 The royalty,
which was a percentage of the value of the phosphate exported, was paid
into three funds: the Nauru Royalty Trust Fund, the Nauruan Landowners'
Royalty Trust Fund, and the Nauruan Community Long-term Investment
Fund. 69 These funds were used to administer the island.
The Commissioners "administered" the island until the outbreak of
World War II.70 Japan occupied Nauru from August 26, 1942, through
December 14, 1945." 1 During this period Japan forcibly deported a large
number of Nauruans, and nearly one-third of the population lost their
lives.72 No phosphate was mined during the period of Japanese occupation
of Nauru.73

Following World War II, Nauru became a United Nations Trust
Territory.74 The United Nations Trusteeship System was, in part,
designed "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their
progressive development towards self-government. .

. ."'

Under the

Trusteeship Agreement, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom
accepted the responsibility of ensuring the safety, well-being, and
development of the Nauruan society. 76
Throughout the periods of the Mandate System and the Trusteeship
System, the Nauruan population became increasingly dissatisfied with their
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Anghie, supra note 15, at 461. The payments, however, were not based on the
market value of the phosphate deposits or the land, nor were they paid directly to the
Nauruans who owned the land. Instead, Nauruans were paid a royalty, characterized by
Australia as a gratuity, based on a percentage of the value of the phosphate that was
exported. Id.
69. VIviAm, supra note 50, at 189-90.
70. See 25 ENCYCLOPiEDIA BRrrANNICA, supra note 24, at 283.
71. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at xi-xii. However, the Independent Commission
of Inquiry found that there "was no material ...supporting any responsibility on the part
of the Japanese government for rehabilitation." Id. at 411.
72. Anghie, supra note 15, at 453.
73. Id. at 451.
74. FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 218.
75. U.N. CHARTER art. 76(b).

76. See Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 2-7.
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minimal participation in the economic and political life on the island. As
a result of criticism from the United Nations, the Nauru Local
Government Council ("NLGC") was formed in 1951 to allow for
increased involvement of the population in the island's affairs. However,
the NLGC lacked any real ability to effect political or economic decisions
on the island."

The Nauruans' continued dissatisfaction with their situation resulted
in the "Nauru Talks," a series of negotiations held between 1964 and 1967
concerning resettlement, rehabilitation, independence, and royalties. The
"Talks" resulted in the adoption of the Nauru Island Phosphate Agreement
("NIPA") in 1967.78 In the NIPA, the partner governments, Australia,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, agreed to sell the mines to the
NLGC for $21 million (Australian).79 In addition, the NLGC agreed to

supply the three governments with phosphate at a below market rate on a
long-term production contract.8 0 Although Australia wanted to include a
clause in the NIPA settling any claims Nauru might have to rehabilitation
of the phosphate lands, such a clause was explicitly rejected by Nauru, and
was not included. 8
Nauruans gained political control over the island on January 31, 1968,
when they were granted independence by Australia, New Zealand, and
Great Britain. 2
C. League of Nations Mandate System
Understanding the essence of Nauru's claim for rehabilitation requires
an examination of the relationship established by the Nauru Mandate and
the Mandate System. This is so because the Trusteeship System, from
which Australia's duty is alleged to have come, was motivated by the same
concerns as the Mandate System.3 As Article 22 of the League of
Nations Covenant gave effect to the Mandate System, it is the best place
to continue the examination. In addition, although there has been no
litigation in the ICJ concerning the breach of obligations under a

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Anghie, supra note 15, at 452.
Id. at 460.
See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 272-73.
See id. at 273.
Id.

82. 1991 BRITANNICA WORLD DATA, supra note 23, at 742.

83. Anghie, supra note 15, at 458.
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4
trusteeship, there has been extensive litigation on the Mandate System.8
These cases help clarify both the Mandate and Trusteeship Systems.
Article 22 creates the principle under which the Mandate System was
to be operated. Article 22 states

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the
late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by
peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the
principle that the well-being and development of such peopleform
a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.85
This principle commands not only that the mandatory act in the "best
interests" of the inhabitants, but also look toward the "well-being and
development" of the people .86 The obligation to exercise its authority
according to these principles arose out of the agreements signed by the
mandatory and the League of Nations. 87
The League of Nations Covenant established three classes of
mandates, "A," "B," and "C," all of which were under the general
supervision of the Permanent Mandates Commission ("PMC"). 8a The
PMC was not an organ of the League, but was given the authority to
receive and examine annual reports from the mandatories to the League
Council. 9 The commission also advised the League Council on all matters
related to the Mandates.' The PMC regarded the Mandate System as a

84. Id.
85.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art.

86. See Louis

22 (emphasis added).

HENKEN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS

275-76

(2d ed. 1989). This entails forecasting long into the future in order to maximize the
territories' potential economic and social development. See Leslie, supra note 26, at 397.

87.

WEERAMANTRY,

supra note 23, at 27.

88. See R.N. CHOWDHURI, INTERNATIONAL MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEMS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 182-228 (1955). PMC had responsibilities similar to those of
the United Nations Trusteeship Council. Specifically, the Commission used three devices
to supervise the mandatories: obligatory annual reports by the mandatory; hearings in
which the mandatory could defend those reports; and the receipt of native petitions and
visiting mission reports. FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 213.
89. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para 9.

90. Id.
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way to bring about the independence of all mandated territories. 9'
Further, the PMC consistently stated that sovereignty over the mandated
territory did not lie in the administering authority. In most cases, this
view affected the actual administrative practices in class "B" and "C"
mandates because it forbade attempts to exercise sovereignty over the
economic assets of the mandated territories.'
Class A mandates comprised the former Ottoman provinces in the
Middle East. In these mandates, the administering authorities had only
nominal authority and limited supervisory power as the territories were
almost ready to attain independence, albeit with the authority's help.93
Class B mandates were composed of the former German colonies of
Central Africa. In these mandates, the administering authorities had
greater power to supervise affairs and administer policies. 94 Such
mandates were vested, and held under trust. 95 All former German
territories in Africa and the Pacific Ocean, including Nauru, were
incorporated into class C mandates.96 These mandates were controlled as
an integral portion of the territory of the mandatory, and were subject to
the mandatory's municipal law.9 7
The Mandate System, which was the first of its kind, reinforced the
general principle that control of a territory is separate and distinct from the
issue of ownership of the territory's economic assets. 9" The trustee was
"precluded from administering the property for his own personal
benefit. "99 The economic assets of the territory needed to be preserved for
a time when the territory would become an independent sovereign
nation." 0 The importance of these rights and obligations is indicated by
the fact that the Mandate System made disputes concerning the

91.
92.
93.
94.

See Anghie, supra note 15, at 457.
id.
FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 212.
Id. at 212.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 213.
97. Putting the Falklands in Trust, FIN. TiMEs LTD., Apr. 28, 1982, § 1, at 16;
FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 212-13.
98. See International Status of South West Africa, 150 I.C.J. 128, 132 (July 11).
99. Id. at 149 (separate opinion of Judge McNair).
100. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
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"interpretation or application" of the mandate justiciable in the Permanent
International Court of Justice.101
Although the League of Nations was short-lived, its principles were
The League supplied the first real example of international
not.
accountability in practice, and the concept of the sacred trust survived the
League's demise.
D. The United Nations Trusteeship System
The Mandate System was officially terminated on April 18, 1946,
following the demise of the League of Nations. 0 2 However, the
relationship established by the Mandate System, 0 3 which some have called
a "sacred trust," or a "fiduciary duty," did not end with the League's
termination.10° When faced with the problem of what to do with the
administration of dependent nations after World War II, the delegates at
the San Francisco Conference ("Conference") turned to the experiences of
the Mandate System and tried to learn from its mistakes. One positive
aspect of the Mandate System, the sacred trust, was carried over into the
United Nations Trusteeship System.'0 5
The United Nations Charter ("Charter") established a set of
obligations that are more precise than those contained in the Mandate
System. These obligations are contained in the Trusteeship System
outlined in Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter."0 6 The foundation of the
Trusteeship System is, however, Chapter XI, entitled the "Declaration
Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories" ("Declaration"), which reestablished the principle of the sacred trust. Although Article 73 is not by
its terms applicable to the International Trusteeship System established by
Chapters XII and XIII, its principles are applied broadly. 101 Article 73 is
considered to be applicable to all areas of the world that are not fully self-

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See, e.g., International Status of South West Africa, 150 I.C.J. 128 (July 11).
See generally CHOWDHMUR, supra note 88, at 113.
Meaning that of an administering authority to the mandated territory.
FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 213.
Id.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-85.

107. CHARMIAN EDWARD ToUsSAiNT, THE TRusTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED

NATIONS 161 (1956).
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governing,' including protectorates, colonies, and other possessions, as
well as trust territories created under the Trusteeship System. 0 9
The Declaration establishes the fundamental principle on which the
Trusteeship System is based-the administering authority recognizes the
"interests of the inhabitantsof these territoriesare [to be] paramount,and
accept[s] as a sacred trust the obligation to promote [to] the utmost...
the well-being of the inhabitants.""0 Further, the Declaration shows the
intention of the Members of the United Nations to promote the political,
social, and economic development of the inhabitants of trust territories and
to promote and to advance international peace and security."lI As with the
Mandate System, the Trusteeship System constitutes a dual mandate-an
to both the territory's inhabitants and the international
obligation running
2
community.'
Some of the objectives of the Trusteeship System are set forth in
Article 76 of the Charter. According to the Charter, the Trusteeship
System was established to promote the political, economic, social, and
educational development of each territory's inhabitants to ensure their
progress toward self-government." 3 In order to ensure that the principles
and objectives of the Trusteeship System would be upheld, the Charter
provided that the General Assembly would perform all United Nations
functions related to the trusteeships." 4 The General Assembly was
charged with the responsibilities of considering reports submitted by the
administering authorities," 5 considering petitions from the trust's
inhabitants, and performing periodic visits to the respective trust
territories. 116
108. See generally EMIL J. SADY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND DEPENDENT PEOPLES
24-25 (1957); U.N. CHARTER art. 73.

109. See generally SADY, supra note 108, at 24-25; U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
110. U.N. CHARTER art. 73 (italics added).
111. Id. art. 73(a)-(e); see FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 214.
112. See generally ToussAINT, supra note 107, at 11. While the obligations of the
Trusteeship System have never been tested by the International Court of Justice, they have
been the subject of litigation indomestic courts. For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that while the substantive provisions of the Charter
were vague, "we do not believe that [a trusteeship] agreement is too vague for judicial
enforcement." Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9th Cir. 1974).
The Saipan case raised issues similar to those raised in the Nauru case.
113. See U.N. CHARTER art. 76(b).
114. See id. art. 85, 1.
115. See id. art. 87, (a).
116. See id. art. 87, (c).
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In fulfilling its responsibilities with respect to the trusteeships, the
General Assembly was assisted by the United Nations Trusteeship Council.
The Trusteeship Council, which was established as an analog to the
PMC," 7 was comprised of countries equally divided between those that
administered trust territories and those that did not. 1 s The council was
charged with the same responsibilities as the General Assembly." 9 In
addition, the council was given the responsibility of drafting a
questionnaire on the "political, economic, social, and educational
The
advancement of the inhabitants of [the] trust territory." 2 0
administering authority would then be responsible for reporting the
answers to the questions to the General Assembly.'

HI. NAURU V. AUSTRALIA
With a basic understanding of Nauru's social and political history, as
well as the Mandate and Trusteeship Systems, one can turn to the dispute
between Nauru and Australia. This section discusses the lawsuit from its
inception to settlement. A case history is followed by a presentation of
Nauru's claims, a discussion of Australia's Preliminary Objections and the
ICJ's decision of June 26, 1992,122 a brief summary of Australia's
response to Nauru's claims,' 23 and a discussion of the settlement of August
10, 1993.124
A. Case History
The lawsuit actually began on August 21, 1987, when Nauru applied
to become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice
("Statute"). 2 5 Nauru sought to become a party to the Statute for the sole

117. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 9-10.
118. See U.N. CHARTER art. 86.

119. See id. art. 87.
120. Id. art. 88.
121. Id.
122. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 240.
123. Id. at 245.
124. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2.
125. See U.N. Doc. S/19137 (1987); U.N. SCOR, 2754 mtg. at 114, U.N. Doc.
A/43/2 (1987). All members of the United Nations are considered parties to the Statute
of the International Court of Justice. A state which is not a member of the U.N. can
become a party to the Statute "on conditions determined by the General Assembly upon
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purpose of bringing suit against Australia, which, as a Member of the
United Nations is also a party to the Statute. 2 6 According to Article 93(2)
of the Charter, a state that is not a member of the United Nations may
become a party to the Statute on conditions "determined by the General
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." 27 After
such a recommendation, 2 ' the General Assembly accepted Nauru as a
party to the Statute of the ICJ.912 As a party to the Statute, Nauru was
30
able to bring suit against Australia in the ICJ.1

On May 19, 1989, Nauru filed an application with the ICJ and
instituted proceedings against Australia for rehabilitation of the phosphate
lands ("Nauru Application"). 31 Jurisdiction was based on Article 36(2)
of the Statute of the Court, whereby states can declare that they recognize
the court's compulsory jurisdiction in all legal disputes.' 32 This

recommendation of the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 93, 2.
126. See U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
127. Id. art. 93, 1 2.
128. Summary Statement by the Secretary-Generalon Matters of which the Security
Council is seized and on the stage reachedin their consideration, Addendum, U.N. Doc.
S/18570/Add.42 (1987). The Security Council recommended that Nauru be admitted as
a party to the Statute of the Court on condition that it deposit an instrument with the
Secretary-General containing (1) acceptance of the provisions of the Statute; (2) acceptance
of all obligations of a member of the United Nations under Article 94 of the Charter; and
(3) an undertaking to contribute to the expenses of the International Court of Justice. See
id.
129. The acceptance was conditioned on the Republic of Nauru filing an instrument,
signed and ratified by the government, containing
(a) [Nauru's] [aicceptance of the provisions of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice;
(b) Acceptance of all the obligations of a Member of the United Nations under
Article 94 of the Charter;
(c) An undertaking to contribute to the expenses of the Court such equitable
amount as the General Assembly shall assess from time to time, after
consultation with the Government of the Republic of Nauru.
Id.
130. See Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 35(1).
131. See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1989 I.C.J. 12 (July
18) [hereinafter Order of July 181.
132. See Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supranote 3, at 245. Article 36(2) states
The . .. parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipsofacto and without special agreement, in relation
to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court
in all legal disputes concerning [the following]:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
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recognition may be conditional-limited in time and based on
reciprocity.' 33 Both Australia and Nauru recognized the ICJ's compulsory
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 36(2).134 Nauru's declaration of acceptance
was deposited with the Secretary-General on January 29, 1988, and
however, the issue of
Australia's on March 17, 1975.1 35 Ultimately,
36
jurisdiction was one for the court to decide.
On July 18, 1989, pursuant to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court,
the ICJ fixed the time limits for filing the written proceedings in the
case. 37 Nauru's Memorial was due on April 20, 1990, and Australia's
Counter-Memorial on January 21, 1991.138 After Nauru filed its
Memorial, Australia filed preliminary objections claiming, among other
things, that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. 139 Pursuant to
Article 79 of the Rules of the Court, the ICJ suspended the proceedings
on the merits and fixed July 19, 1991 as the time for Nauru to present a
written statement concerning the preliminary objections."4 The written
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 36(2).
133. Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 36(3).
134. Acceptance of the ICJ's jurisdiction under Article 36(2) is by the method of
unilateral declaration, deposited with the Secretary-General of the U.N. according to
Article 36(4) of the Statute of the Court. The unilateral declaration of acceptance binds
that state to litigate disputes to the extent the other state's acceptance coincides. See id.
art. 36(2)-(4).
135. See Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 245. Under Nauru's
declaration, the ICJ's jurisdiction is "not extend[ed] to any dispute with respect to which
there exists a dispute settlement mechanism under an agreement between the Republic of
Nauru and another State. . . ." Australia's declaration states that the court's jurisdiction
"does not apply to any dispute in regard to which the parties thereto have agreed or shall
agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement." Id.
136. Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 36(6).
137. Id. art. 48.
138. See Order of July 18, supra note 131.
139. Report of the International Court of Justice, 1 Aug. 1990 - 31 July 1991, U.N.
GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/4 (1991). Nauru's Memorial
was filed on April 20, 1990. Australia's Preliminary Objections were filed on January
16, 1991, within the time-limit for the Counter-Memorial. Id. Australia had yet to file
its Counter-Memorial as of November, 1992. Telephone Interview with Representative
of the ICJ Liaison in New York (Nov. 20, 1992).
140. This was done on February 8, 1991. See Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
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statement was filed on July 17, 1991. 14 From November 11 through 22,
1991, public
hearings were held on the issues of the preliminary
42
objections.
B. Nauru's Claims
The Nauru Application and Memorial raised four principal legal
arguments. First, through its acts and omissions, Australia violated its
express obligations under Article 76 of the Charter and Articles 3 and 5
of the Trusteeship Agreement.' 43 Second, Australia failed to comply with
"international standards recognized as applicable in the implementation of
the principle of self-determination."'" Third, Australia breached its
obligations under general international law. 4 5 And fourth,
Australia
14 6
denied Nauru justice lato sensu (justice in the broad sense).
Factually, Nauru contended that from 1919 to 1967 the phosphate
industry was run insuch a way that the real benefit of the mining went to
the agricultural industries of Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom. 47 The Application alleged that the price paid for the Nauruan
phosphate was kept well below the world market price, and the royalty
rate Nauru received during this period was lower than it would have been
in an arms-length transaction. 48 The price for the phosphate was fixed by
an agreement among the three administering authorities, who each had
priority access to the phosphate.' 49 Also, the excess production was sold
at world market prices for the account of the three authorities. 50
Furthermore, when the NLGC purchased the mines back from the
Commissioners,' it was conditioned on Nauru's supplying the three
supra note 3, at 243.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Nauru Application, supra note 5, at 30.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 12.
148. Id. at 14. It is estimated that the revenue lost as a result of the low royalty rate
is as high as $335 million (Australian). Id. at n. 11.
149. This was reflected in the below market price. Id. at 6-8.
150. Id. at 6.
151. In essence, Nauru bought back its own property by paying a fee to the trustees.
See id. at 12.
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governments with two million tons of phosphate per year, 5 2 all at a
previously fixed price.' 53 As a result, the benefit5 4accruing to the Nauruans
was a great deal less than it should have been.1
Nauru claimed that as well as decreasing the benefit from the mining
industry, none of the three trustees provided for the rehabilitation of the
phosphate lands.'"I Under German administration, the leases with
Nauruan landowners compensated for the devaluation of the land due to
the mining activity. 5 6 However, such provisions were absent from the
agreement with the Commissioners. 5 7 In fact, Nauru claimed that while
Australia was aware of the need for rehabilitation it never acknowledged
an obligation to rehabilitate the devastated land.158 Moreover, Nauru
alleged that during the period from 1924 to 1953 Australia only spent
between twenty and forty
percent of the Commissioner's profits on
1 59
Nauru's administration.
In all, Nauru alleged that Australia, through its own actions and those
of the Commissioners, breached the duty to administer Nauru's economic

152. Id. From Nauru's point of view, this was a total output contract.
153. Id. at 12. Nauru also assumed all liabilities associated with the mining industry.

Id.
154. Id. at 12, 14.
155. Id. at 14. When Nauru began operating the mines, nearly one-third of the
phosphate deposits were already completely mined-out. This left the remaining land
"completely useless for habitation, agriculture, or any other purpose unless and until
rehabilitation was carried out." Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 16. Nauru supported this argument by pointing to a report by Australia to
the Trusteeship Council. The report reads
The phosphate deposits will be exhausted in an estimated period of seventy
years, at the end of which time all but the coastal strip of Nauru will be
worthless. The Australian Government is alive to the possibilities that the
island may not then provide a satisfactory home for the indigenous population,
and that it may be necessary to give the Natives an opportunity to transfer to
some other island.
Id. at 18 (citing U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 74, U.N. Doc. A/933 (1948)).
Nauru also claims that the Commissioners never acknowledged an obligation to pay
royalties to the Nauruan people. To support this point, Nauru cites numerous instances
of correspondence between the Trusteeship Council and Australia regarding the inadequacy
of the royalty and the lack of a positive response in this regard. See id., at 18, 20, 22.
159. Id. at 16.
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the well-being of the
assets in a way that promoted "to the utmost .
60
inhabitants" of Nauru.
As one remedy, Nauru asked the ICJ to find that Australia had
incurred "an international legal responsibility

. .

to make restitution or

other appropriate reparation to Nauru for the damage and prejudice
suffered." 6 ' Although Nauru provided a provisional accounting of the
damages it suffered due to Australia's actions, the Application requested
that the issue of damages be decided in a separate phase of the proceedings
if the parties could not agree thereto.' 62 Nauru also reserved the right to
request aggravated damages to "reflect the particular elements of excess
and the lack of ordinary consideration in the conduct of [Australia] "163
C. Australia's Preliminary Objections and
the Decision of June 26, 1992

In its judgment of June 26, 1992, the ICJ rejected all but one of
Australia's seven preliminary objections. 164 In a unanimous vote, the court
did uphold Australia's objection concerning Nauru's claim to the
Australian allocation of the overseas assets of the British Phosphate

160. U.N. CHARTER art. 73; see also Nauru Application, supra note 5, at 30.
161. Nauru Application, supra note 5, at 30-32.
162. Id. at 32.
163. Id.
164. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 257-67. Australia raised
seven Preliminary Objections to the Nauru Application:
1. The ICJ lacked jurisdiction to deal with Nauru's Application because of
Australia's reservation to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, id. at 245-47;
2.
Nauru waived all claims relating to the rehabilitation of the phosphate lands,
id. at 247-50;
3.
the termination of the Trusteeship by the U.N. precludes the claims from now
being asserted, id. at 250-53;
4.
Nauru's claims are inadmissible on the ground that they were not raised within
a reasonable time, id. at 253-55;
5. Nauru failed to act in good faith in relation to the rehabilitation of the
phosphate land, id. at 255;
Nauru's claims are inadmissible because any judgment on the breach of the
6.
Trusteeship Agreement involves the responsibility of New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, who have not consented to the ICJ's jurisdiction in this case,
id. at 255-62; and
7.
Nauru's claims concerning the overseas assets of the British Phosphate
Commissioners do not arise out of a legal dispute between the parties within
the meaning of Article 36(2), id. at 262-67.
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Commissioners. 165 However, in a nine to four vote, the court found that,
based on Article 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ, 166 it had jurisdiction to
entertain Nauru's Application and that the suit was permissible under
international law. 167 What follows is a brief presentation of the facts on
which Australia based its preliminary objections and the ICJ's reasoning
and decision on each.
To prove its first objection-that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction over the
case168-Australia pointed to three facts. First, the General Assembly and
Trusteeship Council had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute as the
parties' relationship arose out of the Trusteeship Agreement.169 Second,
there was ample opportunity to resolve the dispute under the Trusteeship
System, and any dispute of that nature should be regarded as having been
settled by the fact of the Trusteeship's termination. 170 Third, Nauru had
raised the issue of rehabilitation during the Nauru Talks, and, at the end
of those discussions, the issue was not covered in the Nauru Island
Basically, Australia contended that the two
Phosphate Agreement.'
nations agreed to have recourse to some other method of settling this
dispute, one outside of Australia's decr-ation of compulsory jurisdiction.72
Therefore, Australia argued, the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
In rejecting Australia's first objection, the ICJ reasoned that Article
36(2) only applied to disputes between States, and therefore the issue was
whether "Australia and the Republic of Nauru did or did not, after . . .
Nauru acceded to independence, conclude an agreement whereby the two
States undertook to settle their dispute . . . by resorting to an agreed
procedure other than recourse to the Court." 73 The ICJ found that there
was no evidence of such an agreement after Nauru achieved independence.
Therefore, based on Article 36(2), the court decided it had jurisdiction to
hear the case. 7 4

165. Id. at 268.
166. Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 36(2).
167. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 269; Order of June 29, supra
note 16, at 346.
168. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 245-46.
169. Id. at 246-47.
170. Id. at 247.
171. id. at 246.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 246.
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Australia argued that its second objection-that the Nauruan
authorities waived all claims to rehabilitation of the phosphate
lands' 7 -was supported by two facts. First, the implicit result of the 1967
Agreement was that Nauru had waived any claims to rehabilitation. 7 6 By
accepting transfer of the entire phosphate industry to its control, Nauru
was accepting all responsibility for rehabilitating the land. 77 Second, a
statement by the Nauruan Head Chief to the General Assembly amounted
to an undertaking by the Nauruan authorities to finance the rehabilitation
of the land from 7future revenue and constituted a waiver of any claim
against Australia. 1
With respect to Australia's second objection, the ICJ noted that the
NIPA contained no clause that expressly waived Nauru's claims to
rehabilitation, nor could the Agreement, when read as a whole, be seen as
implying such a waiver. 79 Furthermore, when viewed in context, the
statements by Nauruan officials did not imply a "departure from the point
of view expressed clearly

and repeatedly by the

.

.

. Nauruan

people"l'-Australia was responsible for rehabilitating the phosphate
lands.' Therefore, those statements should not be interpreted as a waiver
175. Id. at 247.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 248. Speaking to the Fourth Committee of the U.N. Generally Assembly
on December 6, 1967, the Nauruan Head Chief, Mr. DeRoburt said
[The island had the] good fortune [to possess] large deposits of high-grade
phosphate. That economic base, of course, presented its own problems. One
which worries Nauruans derived from the fact that the land from which
phosphate had been mined would be totally unusable. Consequently, although
it would be an expensive operation, that land would have to be rehabilitated
and steps were already being taken to build up funds to be used for that
purpose. That phosphate was a wasting asset was, in itself, a problem; in
about twenty-five years' time the supply would be exhausted. The revenue
which Nauru had received in the past and would receive during the next
twenty-five years would, however, make it possible to solve that problem.
Id. at 248-49.
179. Id. at 250.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 249. In a meeting of the 33rd session of the Trusteeship Council, a
representative of Nauru stated that
[Tihe responsibility for rehabilitating the Island, in so far as it is the
Administering Authority's, remains with the Administering Authority. If it
should turn out that Nauru gets its own independence in January 1968, from
then on the responsibility will be ours. A rough assessment of the portions of
responsibility for this rehabilitation exercise then is this: one-third is the
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for rehabilitation of the phosphate lands mined prior to
of Nauru's claims
82
1
independence.
The third objection-that termination of the Trusteeship by the United
Nations precluded the claims from being asserted' 83-was relatively
simple. Australia claimed that the competence to determine any breach of
the Trusteeship Agreement was with the Trusteeship Council and General
Assembly. 4 And, therefore, when the Geneml Assembly terminated the
Trusteeship, the system of administration came to an end, and, "in the
absence of an express reservation on the Administering Authority, the
and operate[d] as a complete discharge from
termination [was] conclusive
18 5
responsibility."
all further
The ICJ summarily rejected Australia's third objection, noting that the
General Assembly had expressed its desire that Australia address the
rehabilitation issue. 16 Although Resolution 2347,17 which terminated the
Trusteeship Agreement, did not expressly reserve any rights to
rehabilitation, the court did not view the resolution as a waiver of such
rights either. 88 In other words, "the rights Nauru might have had in
connection with rehabilitation of the lands remained unaffected" by the
termination of the Trusteeship.'8 9
Australia's fourth objection is similar to the defense of laches.19
Australia claimed that from its independence in January 1968 to December
1988, Nauru did not formally raise the issue of rehabilitation with
Australia or the other Administering Powers.' 9 ' As a result of this delay,
responsibility

of the

Administering

Authority

and

two-thirds

is the

responsibility of the Nauruan people.

Id.
182. Id. at 250.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 251.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 252-53; see also G.A. Res. 2111, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14,
at 160-61, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
187. G.A. Res. 2347, U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 290, U.N. Doc.

A/6716 (1967).
188. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 253.
189. Id.
190. The doctrine of laches is based upon equity. It is defined as the failure to assert
a right or claim that, taken together with the lapse of time and other circtmstances, causes
prejudice to the adverse party, and operates as a bar to the lawsuit. See, e.g., DAVID D.
SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 42-43 (2d ed. 1991).

191. See Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 253.
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Australia had been prejudiced in that much of the documentation relating
to the Mandate and Trusteeship had been lost or misplaced in the
interval."9 Further, additional prejudice existed because developments in
the law during this time had rendered it difficult to ascertain the legal
obligations of the Administering Authorities at the time the alleged
breaches occurred. 93 Therefore, Australia argued, Nauru's claims were
inadmissible because they were not submitted within a reasonable time. 9 4
In rejecting this objection, the ICJ disagreed with Australia's
assessment of the facts. First, however, the court acknowledged that a
delay on the part of a claimant may render an application inadmissible, but
that "international law does not lay down any specific time-limit in that
regard." 9 9 The court then pointed out that, as early as February 1969,
Nauru had notified Australia of its desire to work out a specific
rehabilitation scheme for the island. 196 Moreover, there were subsequent
197
written and oral indications of Nauru's claims to Australian officials.
Therefore, the court found that the Nauruan "Application was not rendered
inadmissible by [the] passage of time."' 98
Australia's fifth objection-lack of good faith on Nauru's part-also
was summarily rejected by the ICJ.199 Australia claimed that "Nauru has
failed to act consistently and in good faith in relation to rehabilitation,"
and that the court should "exercise . . . its discretion and . . . uphold

judicial propriety" by "declin[ing] to hear the Nauruan claims." 2" In
other words, Australia argued that because Nauru had continued to mine
the phosphate and had not yet acted to rehabilitate the lands, it should be
precluded from raising its claims against Australia. Noting that the
Application had been properly submitted in the framework of remedies
open to Nauru, the ICJ stated that it was too early to decide this issue, but
that at that point Nauru's conduct did not amount to an abuse of process.
Therefore, the court rejected this objection.201

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Australia's sixth objection-Nauru's claims were inadmissible because
any judgment involved the responsibility of New Zealand and the United
Kingdom, neither of whom had consented to the ICJ's jurisdiction in this
case-contained two aspects.2 2 First, Australia argued that the nature of
Nauru's claims-arising out of the Trusteeship Agreement-required that
the suit be brought against the three States jointly and not against one of
them individually.2 3 Second, Australia claimed that deciding the merits
of the case would involve a finding as to the discharge of the United
Kingdom's and New Zealand's obligations under the Agreement without
their presence. This would be prejudicial to the two nations and contrary
to the fundamental principle2 4that the jurisdiction of the ICJ derives solely
from the consent of States. 0
The ICJ rejected both aspects of this argument. With regard to the
first aspect, the court noted that the question of joint and several liability
was one that should be reserved for the merits phase, but was independent
from the issue of whether Australia could be sued alone.20 5 The court did
not see any reason why the claims against Australia should not proceed
absent the other nations' presence. In the court's opinion, "lilt could not
be denied that Australia had obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement
• ..and there is nothing in the character of the Agreement which debars
the [c]ourt from considering a claim for breach of those obligations by
Australia."2" With regard to the second aspect, after a lengthy discussion,
the ICJ found that New Zealand and the United Kingdom were not
necessary parties to the proceedings regarding the Nauru Application.20 7
Further, Article 59 of the Statute protects the interests of States not party
to the case.208 Therefore, the court was free to adjudicate the claims
notwithstanding the absence of the two nations.20 9
202. Id. at 255-56, 258.
203. Id. at 258. In this context, Australia raised the question of whether the liability
of the three States under the Agreement was joint and several so that any one of them
could be liable to make full reparation for the damage flowing from the administration of
Nauru. Id. at 258-59.
204. Id. at 259; see also Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 36.
205. See Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 261-62.
206. Id. at 259.
207. Id. at 261-62.
208. Id. at 261; see also Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 59.
209. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, supra note 3, at 261-62.
[The ICJ's] jurisdiction depends on the consent of States and, consequently, the
Court may not compel a State to appear before it, even by way of intervention.
A State, however, which is not a party to a case is free to apply for permission

30
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Australia's final objection-that Nauru's claim to the overseas assets
of the British Phosphate Commissioners was inadmissible as the ICJ had
no jurisdiction-was based on several grounds.210 Primarily, Australia
alleged that the claim was a new one, as it first appeared in Nauru's
Memorial.2 ' The court agreed with Australia and found that the claim
first appeared in the Memorial and was not part of the original claim in
the Application.
Therefore, the ICJ decided that the claim was
inadmissible and upheld the objection.2" 2
D. Australia's Response to Nauru's Claims
Following the ICJ's decision on Australia's preliminary objections, the
court set time limits for further pleadings in the case. 13 Under the Order,
Australia's Counter-Memorial was due on March 29, 1993, while a
decision on the subsequent procedure was reserved.214
Australia's Counter-Memorial was in fact filed on March 29, 1993,215
to intervene in accordance with Article 62 of the Statute ....

But the absence

of such a request in no way precludes the Court from adjudicating upon the
claims submitted to it, provided that the legal interests of the third State which
may possibly be affected do not form the very subject-matter of the decision
that is applied for. Where the Court is so entitled to act, the interests of the
third State which is not a party to the case are protected by Article 59 of the
Statute of the Court, which provides that "[t]he decision of the Court has no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case."
Id. (quoting Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 59.)
210. Id. at 264. All of the grounds were not addressed by the ICJ. The grounds were
the claim is a new one; Nauru has not established that the claim arises out of
a "legal dispute" between the [p]arties, within the meaning of Article 36,
paragraph 2 of the Statute of the Court; Nauru cannot claim any legal 'tileto
the assets in question and has not proven a legal interest capable of justifying
its claim in this regard; and each of the objections raised by Australia
concerning the other claims by Nauru also applies to the claim relating to the
overseas assets.
Id.
211. Id. at 265.
212. Id. at 265-66. The ICJ may decide a new claim as long as it can be included in
the original claim in substance. Here, even though the claim was a new one, it was not
implicit in the Application, nor did it arise directly out of the question that was the subject
matter of the Application. Therefore, the court could properly dismiss the claim. See
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.) 1962 I.C.J. 36 (June 15); Fisheries
lurisdiction (F.R.G. v. ice.) 1974 I.C.I. 203 (Jly 25).
213. Order of June 29, supra note 16, at 345.
214. Id. at 346.
215. See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austrl.), 1993 I.C.J. 316 (Order
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and, while its contents have not been made public, the arguments are not
difficult to discern based on the preliminary objections and public
statements made by the government.2t 6
First, Australia has consistently argued that, as neither the Trusteeship
Council nor the General Assembly ever expressly declared Australia to be
in violation of their obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement and
United Nations Charter, it could not be responsible for the rehabilitation
of the phosphate lands.2 17 In addition, although Australia lost the
jurisdictional phase of the proceedings, many of the arguments raised in
that phase also would have been raised in the merits phase.21 8
Second, Australia argued that the Nauruan people experienced a
higher standard of living under the Mandate and Trusteeship Systems than
ever before. 219 According to Australia, Nauruan health care, public
services, and education all improved exponentially during the period of
Australian administration. 220 Therefore, it satisfied its obligations under
the Trusteeship Agreement and the United Nations Charter.
Third, Australia claimed that Nauru already has the means to
rehabilitate the island's phosphate lands. Australia claimed that as the
NIPA gave Nauru the economic benefit of the phosphate industry, and as
the three administering authorities transferred their interest in the mining
concession without compensation, Nauru could afford to rehabilitate the
phosphate lands without Australia's assistance. 22' Further, Australia has
consistently maintained that the revenue from the phosphate industry
ensured Nauru's long-term prosperity.222
Interestingly, Australia's final argument is that because the
beneficiaries of the trust, the Nauruans, were adequately provided for, the

of June 25) [hereinafter Order of June 25].

216. See generally Anghie, supra note 15, at 464.
217. Id. at 465 (citing Preliminary Objections of Australia (Nauru v. Austl.), 1990
I.C.J. Pleadings (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru), para. 404, at 162-63 (Dec. 1990)).
218. For an example of how these types of arguments are raised in a merits phase, see
South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 4 (July 18)
(Second Phase Judgment).
219. AUSTRALIAN DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, NAURU: INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JusTIcE ACTION AGAINST AUsTRALIA, reprintedin 13 Austl. Y.B. Int'l L.
409, 410 (1992).
220. See id.
221. See id. at 411.
222. See id.
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trustee, Australia, could use the remaining trust assets for its own
benefit. 2"
E. The Settlement Agreement
Following the submission of Australia's Counter-Memorial, the ICJ
fixed time limits for the final pleadings in the case.224 Nauru was given
until December 22, 1993 to file a Reply, and Australia was given until
September 14, 1994 to file a Rejoinder. 25 However, the parties never
filed such pleadings as the case was settled on August 10, 1993. The
parties notified the ICJ of the settlement on September 9, 1993 and agreed
to discontinue the proceedings. 2 6 The case was discontinued on
September 13, 1993.227
Pursuant to the settlement, Australia agreed to pay Nauru $107
million (Australian) "in an effort to assist the Republic of Nauru in its
preparations for its post-phosphate future." 22 1 However, the Settlement
Agreement explicitly states that the settlement payments "are made without
prejudice to Australia's long-standing position that it bears no
responsibility for the rehabilitation of the phosphate lands. , 229 While the
inclusion of such a provision is not surprising and may seem to strike a
blow against the existence of an international fiduciary duty, this is not the
case. The Settlement Agreement, along with other factors, can be viewed,
at the very least, as a tacit acknowledgment of some responsibility by
Australia for the massive environmental and economic damage perpetrated
on the island of Nauru.
The settlement payments themselves are due over a twenty-one year
period.2 31 A total of $57 million (Australian) was to be paid on or before
August 31, 1994, in various installments. 23 The remaining $50 million

223. See Anghie, supra note 15, at 464.

224. See Order of June 25, supra note 215, at 317.
225. See id.
226. See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Order
of September 13) [hereinafter Order of Sept. 13].
227. See id.
228. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
229. Id. art. 1(1).
230. id.

231. Id. Ten million was due by August 31, 1993. Id. Thirty million was due on or
before December 31, 1994. Id. Seventeen million was due on August 31, 1994. Id. art.

l(1)(a)-(c).
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(Australian) is due over the next twenty years in annual installments at a
rate of $2.5 million, "maintained in real terms by reference to the
Australia Bureau of Statistics' non-farm GDP deflator." 232 At the
conclusion of the twenty-year period, Australia will continue to provide
development cooperation assistance to Nauru at a mutually agreed level.233
The United Kingdom and New Zealand each agreed to pay $8.5 million
(Australian) toward the settlement. 3
The Settlement Agreement also includes a general release of all claims
against Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom,235 as well as23a6
provision wherein the parties agree to discontinue their action in the ICJ.
Both of these provisions are typical of settlement agreements in the
municipal and international contexts.2 37

On August 10, 1993, in addition to signing the Settlement Agreement,
the Australian Government and Nauru signed the Joint Declaration of
Principles Guiding Relations Between Australia and the Republic of Nauru
("Joint Declaration"). 38 The purpose of the Joint Declaration was to
"maintain and strengthen" the "unique and historical" relationship shared
by the two countries. 239 Through the Joint Declaration, the nations sought
"to build on existing bilateral, regional and other mutually beneficial
arrangements in accordance with their shared commitment to constructive
co-operation. "240
The Joint Declaration is interesting in that it covers a wide range of
subjects, including, among other things, diplomatic cooperation and
consular representation, financial services cooperation, fisheries
surveillance assistance, communication and travel, crime, terrorism and
232. Id. art. l(1)(d).

233. Id. art. 1(2).
234. Kalinga Seneviratne, Environment-Nauru: Britain, New Zealand Pay for Past
Plunder, Inter Press Service, Mar. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
INPRES File.
235. Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.
236. Id. art. 2. The Settlement Agreement also contains an article which provides that
the Agreement will "enter into force on the date on which the parties have notified each
other that the constitutional requirements of each party for the entry into force ...have
been complied with." Id. art. 4.
237. See BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY 1289-90 (definition of release), 1372 (definition
of settlement) (6th ed. 1990).
238. Joint Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Australia and the
Republic of Nauru, Aug. 10, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1476.
239. Id.
240. Id.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 16

smuggling, and legal cooperation.2 41 More specifically, the Joint
Declaration accords most-favored nation status on each country and
2 42
removes all tariff and non-tariff barriers between the nations.
Moreover, the Joint Declaration ensures that Nauru will receive the
"maximum economic benefit from the production and international
marketing of its phosphate resources. "243 Although the legal effect of the
Joint Declaration cannot be questioned, its future practical effect on
Nauru's economy remains largely unknown.
F. Post-settlement Rehabilitation Plans
Four-fifths of Nauru was stripped to mine the phosphate deposits. 2 "
Once mined, the land becomes unsuitable for almost any purpose.245
Although Nauru still continues to mine the remaining land, it does so on
a much smaller scale than done previously because of the diminished
phosphate supply. 246 However, even with conservative mining, the
island's phosphate deposits will be depleted by the year 2000 at the
latest. 247 Accordingly, Nauru has developed a number of other possible
assets to provide for the population's needs.2 48 To those ends, Nauru has
developed a plan to rehabilitate the phosphate lands into habitable land.249
Although the details of the rehabilitation plan have not been made
public, some aspects have been mentioned. The plan calls for "areas of
biological diversity," which will be strategically located throughout the
periphery of the island and will expand into a developing rain forest.250
Nauru will establish horticulture stations at each area, where workers will

241. id.
242. "[Als may be consistent with both countries' domestic requirements and
international commitments, recognizing that Australia already offers free and unrestricted

access into the Australian market for all Naurua products (except sugar) on a nonreciprocal basis under SPARTECA." Id.
243. Id.

244. Michael Field, Nauru outlinesplans to "recreatethe Garden of Eden", AGENCE
FRANCE

PRESSE, May 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.

245. Id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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nurse seedlings into trees, then into a forest, etc. 251' Nauru also intends to
use the mined-out coral pinnacles as building material and land fill. 252 The
land will be graded, and catchment basins and reservoirs will be built for
the storage of rain water.253 It is clear that Nauru's ecological and
economic future depends, in part, on the success of the rehabilitation plan.
IV. TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL FIDUCIARY DUTY

Although the dispute between Nauru and Australia has been settled,
and the International Court of Justice did not have an opportunity to decide
the merits of the case, it is not mere speculation to state that the court
would have found that an international fiduciary duty exists, and that it
was breached by Australia. In this respect, the ICJ would have made
history, as no prior court has decided this exact issue.
At this point it would be helpful to clarify what is meant by a
"fiduciary duty." Black's Law Dictionary defines a fiduciary relationship
as one which is "founded on trust or confidence reposed by one person in
the integrity and fidelity of another." 254 Also, a person acts in a fiduciary
capacity when she transacts business, or handles property which is not her
own, for the benefit of another person as to whom she stands in a relation
of implying a great deal of confidence and trust.25 5 Out of the relationship
arises the duty to act for the benefit of the other while subordinating one's
personal interest.25 6 A person under a fiduciary duty must not exert

influence or pressure on the beneficiary, deal with the subject matter of
the trust as to benefit himself or prejudice the beneficiary, or take personal
highest duty implied by
advantage of the relationship.257 In all, this is the
2 58
breach.
its
for
liability
always
is
there
and
law,
In determining whether the ICJ would have found that an international
fiduciary duty exists, one would have to follow the guidelines of Article
38 of the Statute of the Court. Article 38 requires that in deciding
disputes the court must apply (1) international conventions or treaties; (2)
customary international law; (3) general principles of law; or (4) judicial
251. Id.

252. Id.
253. Id.

254.
255.
256.
257.

BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 237, at 626.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id. at 626.

258. Id.
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decisions, scholarly writings, and other subsidiary means for determining
rules of law. 259

application. 21

These sources are listed in descending order of

Therefore, to determine the existence and scope of the

international fiduciary duty, the ICJ would first look to international

conventions or treaties.
A. Trusteeship Agreement and United Nations Charter
The first place the ICJ would have looked for evidence of an
international fiduciary duty is in the Nauru Trusteeship Agreement and in
the United Nations Charter. Trusteeship Agreements have characteristics
of international conventions and treaties, and, despite the difference in
nomenclature, they are considered the same.26 1 In fact, the drafters of the
Charter intended the Trusteeship Agreements to be interstate treaties to
which the United Nations would be a confirming party. 262 Therefore, the
Nauru Trusteeship Agreement is akin to an international convention to
which Australia had adhered, and it would have been examined first for
evidence of the existence of an international fiduciary duty.263
In interpreting the Trusteeship Agreement, one may use the principles
espoused in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna
Convention"), 26 even though that convention is not by its terms

259.
260.
(1988).
261.
262.

See Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 38.
See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION

TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

4-5

See, e.g., id. at 9; see also Leslie, supra note 26, at 413.
See Clive Parry, The Legal Nature of Trusteeship Agreements, 27 BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 164, 194-95 (194D) ("T"he Draftsmen of the Chanei envisaget tusteeship
agreements as inter-state administering agreements to which the [U.N.] would not-save
possibly in the case where the organization itself become an authority-be a contracting
party").
263. Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9. Although at one time the nature of
trusteeship agreements was unclear, it is now understood. At the very least it is an
agreement by the trustee and the U.N. for the benefit of the inhabitants, who are not
parties. See generally ToussAINr, supra note 107, at 77-87. The Nauru Trusteeship
Agreement is like a multilateral treaty in that Australia, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the United Nations are all signatories, and have agreed that Australia would
administer the "territory." Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9. The Agreement is also
like a unilateral declaration under Article 36, as each country is declaring that it will act
according to the objectives of Article 76 of the Charter, since the U.N. is only a
confirming party. See id.
264. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1980 U.N.T.S. 332
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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applicable. The Vienna Convention is applicable as evidence of the
custom of interpreting treaties. 265 Accordingly, in examining the
Trusteeship Agreement to determine whether an international fiduciary
duty exists, a court may use the principle of interpreting treaties in good
faith and in accordance with the plain meaning of the text2' and also apply
the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.267
Under the Nauru Trusteeship Agreement, Australia, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom agreed to place Nauru under the International
Trusteeship System. 268 The purpose of this system was to benefit the
inhabitants of trust territories with guidance and aid from the administering
authority. 269 Further, the nations agreed that Australia would act as the
"administering authority" of the territory. 270 Therefore, Australia is bound
by the plain meaning of the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement, as well
as the International Trusteeship System, which appears to create an
international fiduciary duty.
Article 3 of the Trusteeship Agreement states that the "Administering
Authority [should undertake] to administer the Territory in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter and in such a manner as to achieve in
the Territory the basic objectives of the International Trusteeship
The major provision concerning the International
System . .27.
Trusteeship System is the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing
272
Territories.
According to the Declaration, United Nations members who
administer trust territories assume the same sacred trust as a mandatory
did under the Mandate System. 273 Article 73 of the United Nations
Charter states
265. Even though Nauru and Australia are signatories to the Vienna Convention, it is
limited by its terms to treaties between States and cannot be applied retroactively. Id.
arts. 3, 4. However, its provisions can be used as evidence of customary international
law. See IAN M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 153
(1984).
266.

"...

in their context and in light of [the Treaty's] object and purpose." Vienna

Convention, supra note 264, art. 31.
267. "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith." Id. art. 26 (italics added).
268. Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9.

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 3.
U.N. Charter ch. XI.
Id.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 16

Members of the United Nations which have or assume
responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples
have not yet attained a full-measure of self-government recognize
the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these
territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the
obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of
international peace and security established by the present
274
Charter,the well-being of the inhabitantsof these territories.
The Declaration shows the intention of the members to reinstate the
sacred trust of the Mandate System. At the heart of the sacred trust is the
obligation to exercise power for the benefit of the inhabitants and in so
doing to protect their natural rights.27 Moreover, the trust is supported
by international accountability, because, in the Trusteeship System, U.N.
members accept responsibility and are therefore accountable.276
By referring to Article 76 of the U.N. Charter and thus to the
Trusteeship System, Article 3 of the Trusteeship Agreement indicates an
intent of the drafters to create a system where the administering authority
would place the interest of the inhabitants first and administer the territory
to the maximum benefit of the inhabitants.277 Also, the authority would

protect the natural rights of the inhabitants, including the island's
economic assets. 278 Further, this relationship is explicitly called 20a
"trust. "279 These characteristics are typical of a fiduciary relationship
and indicate that the nations of the world intended that such a duty be
created by the Trusteeship System.
To characterize the relationship between an administering authority
and the territory as one of a fiduciary nature, and to impose the resultant
obligations, one need go no further than the plain meaning of the word
trusteeship (or trust). Article 75 of the Charter describes the system as a
"Trusteeship" and states that the administering authorities can place such
territories in "trust." 28' The plain meaning of trustee or trust in both

274. U.N. CHARTER art. 73 (italics added).

275.
276.
277.
278.

See id.
U.N. CHARTER ch. XI.
Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 3, 5.
Id. art. 5.

279. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
280. Id.; see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 237.
281. U.N. CHARTER art. 75.
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English and French (tutelage, tutelle) connotes a fiduciary relationship.2" 2
It can be presumed that the drafters of the convention used these words
knowing their obvious connotations and meant the same.
Article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement refines the Administering
Authority's duty even further.283 It calls for Australia to "take into
consideration the customs and usages of the inhabitants of Nauru and
respect the rights and safeguard the interests, both present and future, of
the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory.... 24 Under the Trusteeship
System, Australia was also to promote the economic, social, educational,
and cultural advancement of the inhabitants.2" 5 The language of Article
5(2)(b) 216 mirrors that of Article 76(b) of the Charter.
The basic objectives of the Trusteeship System, as embodied in
Article 76,27 are consonant with the intentions expressed

in the

Declaration. 28

Article 76 states that the basic objectives of the
Trusteeship System are the following:
(a) to further international peace and security;
(b) to promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their
progressive development towards self-government or
independence ...

;

(c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.

.

.; and

(d) to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and
commercial matters for all Members of the United
Nations.

289

The promotion of international peace and security, along with the
obligation to advance political and economic development toward selfgovernment, creates a dual mandate. 2s Under the dual mandate, the
282.
283.
284.
285.

See Leslie, supra note 26, at 410-12.
Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9, art. 5.
Id. art. 5(2)(a) (italics added).
Id.

286. Id. art. 5(2)(b).
287. U.N. CaARTER att.76.

288. U.N.
289. Id.

CHARTER

ch. XI.

290. See ToussAINT, supra note 107, at 53 (referring to U.N. CHARTER art. 76).
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obligations of the sacred trust run to the inhabitants of the territory and to
the world at large. This concept has been recognized internationally for
of the dual
quite some time. 29 ' In fact, Article 76 embodies the2 principle
92
mandate more clearly than did the Mandate System.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship is also evidenced in the basic
objectives of Article 76.293 The obligation to look after what could be
called the "best interest" of the inhabitants, found in Article 76(b),
supports this point, as a fiduciary must act in the best interest of the
beneficiary.294 Similarly, the objective of economic advancement of the
inhabitants indicates that a fiduciary must act with the intent of maximizing
the benefit under the trust. 295 In all, there is clearly a fiduciary duty
running from the administering authority to the inhabitants of the trust
territory. Although the nature of that duty is the same under the
Trusteeship and Mandate Systems, the scope of the duty is different.
Under the Trusteeship System, the scope of the sacred trust exceeds
that of the Mandate System.296 Under the Trusteeship System, the
relationship between administering authority and trust territory was thought
to be one of a temporary nature, in which the administering authority
would guide the territory toward self-government. 297 Under the Mandate
System, the relationship was considered more permanent, i.e., the territory
was to be administered as an "integral part" of the controlling nation.29
As such, the administering authority owed a lesser duty to the territory.
In other words, under the Trusteeship System, the administering authority
owes more of a duty than under the Mandate System because the interests
of the inhabitants are paramount, and the territory is not considered part
of the controlling nation.299 Therefore, based on Articles 3 and 5 of the
Trusteeship Agreement, 3° Australia agreed to assume an explicit fiduciary
duty to act in the best long-term interest of the inhabitants of Nauru and

291. See id. at 13; see also LoRD LUGARD, THE DuAL

MANDATE IN BRrrTSH

TROPICAL AFRICA 18 (1923).

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See ToussAiNT, supra note 107, at 53; U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
Id.; see also BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 237, at 625.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 76(b).
FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 215.
Id.
Id.

See generally FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 215.
Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 3, 5.
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with an eye to promoting their political and economic well-being to the
utmost.
That Australia is bound by the fiduciary duty is buttressed by the
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. Because of this rule of customary
international law, when the Trusteeship Agreement was in force, it bound
Australia to undertake its duty in good faith.

B. Customary InternationalLaw
Even if the Nauru Trusteeship Agreement is deemed not to be a
binding treaty, the principles described therein would be applicable as
evidence of customary international law. The concept of a trust at
international law, and the resulting fiduciary duty, has existed for a few
centuries. Only recently, however, has it risen to the level of customary
international law.3 ' The League of Nations Covenant, the United Nations
Charter, statements from delegates at the San Francisco Convention, and
court decisions are all evidence of the existence and extent of the fiduciary
duty at customary international law.
A contemporary source for the international fiduciary duty is the
League of Nations Covenant.30 2 The Mandate System was the first to
recognize the fiduciary duty, and it represented the culmination of a large
amount of thinking and practice concerning the duty an Administering
Authority owes to the territory's inhabitants.3

3

Article 22 of the League

of Nations Covenant emphasizes the concept of a fiduciary duty.304 Terms
like "mandate" and "tutelage" signify the fundamental fiduciary
relationship between a mandatory and the mandated territory. 30 5 Further,
the Mandate System was established with international accountability for
the conduct of the mandatory,30 6 which is a central feature of a fiduciary
relationship.
There was some debate concerning the effect of the phrase calling for
the mandate territory to be administered "under the laws of the Mandatory
as [an] integral portion[ ] of its territory... ,,307 This raised the question
of the location of sovereignty over the territory's assets during the
301. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 77-84.
302. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.
303. Id.
3 4. Id.
305. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 87.

306. See id.
307.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT

art. 22, para. 6.
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mandate period: Was sovereignty with the territory, or the mandatory?
Even though there was controversy over the Covenant and mandates, "the
legal structure thus created established unequivocally, so far as the law
was concerned, the central notions of trusteeship, pursuit of the well-being
of accountability of mandatories which
of the inhabitants and the principle
30 8
lay at the heart of the system."
Despite the controversy, however, the concept of the sacred trust and
the resulting fiduciary duty persisted. The United Nations Charter also
manifests the general and consistent practice of States regarding the
existence of the fiduciary duty. The creation of the Trusteeship System,
which is very similar in form to the Mandate System, shows that States
believed in the sacred trust despite the failure of the League of Nations.3O9
Evidence of the continuation of a fiduciary duty is found in the similar
wording of the fundamental obligation in Article 22 of the Covenant and
This
the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories.310
evidences a widespread recognition of the obligation of the sacred trust.
However, the Declaration goes even further than the Covenant by
recognizing the attitudinal change regarding the relationship of an
administering authority to the inhabitants. Under the Covenant, mandates
were to be administered as "integral portions of [the] territory.- 31 ' By
making the interest of inhabitants "paramount,"32 the Declaration showed
that the emphasis was to be placed on the rights of the inhabitants of the
territories, not on the rights of the member States.3 13

The fiduciary duty persisted, withstanding the changes in the
administration of the systems. The sacred trust of the Mandate System
was continued in the words and specific objectives of the Trusteeship
System. The creation of the United Nations Trusteeship System is
evidence of the existence of a widespread belief that a nation overseeing
the development of a non-self-governing territory should maintain a
fiduciary relationship with the territory's inhabitants. Further, the use of
the word "trust" in the Charter and Trusteeship Agreement recognizes a

308. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 89.
309. See FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 234-35.
310. Compare LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para 1. with U.N.
art. 73.
311. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 6.

312. See U.N.

CHARTER

CHARTER

art. 73.

313. See U.N. GAOR, 2d. Sess., at 56, Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/315 (1947).
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"well-defined responsibility assumed by the administering authority on
behalf of the territories' inhabitants"-the fiduciary duty.3 14
Additional evidence of the international fiduciary duty at customary
international law exists in the statements of delegates at the San Francisco
Conference. 315 Throughout the debates, delegates made reference to the
purpose, scope, and expectations for the Trusteeship System. Speaking
of the inhabitants' expectations from the System, the delegate from the
former Soviet Union stated that the Trusteeship System "gave rise to the
hopes among the [inhabitants] that the way to development in economic,
cultural and political fields would be open to them. , 316 The delegate from
the United Kingdom stated that the Trusteeship System brought with it "all
the hope . . . for millions of people throughout the world," that they

would be brought along the "road to self-government and
independence." 3 17 Finally, one delegate said that the Trusteeship System
"constitu[ted] progress in the field of international law, a step towards the
final liberation of colonial peoples, towards their independence, and
towards realizing the principle of the right of self-determination." 318 All
of these statements can be seen as creating an expectation of benefits on
the part of the inhabitants of trust territories, and a resulting duty on the
part of the administering authorities. These views evidence the existence
of a fiduciary duty at international law.
C. General Principles of Municipal Law
Although the Trusteeship Agreement, the United Nations Charter, and
customary international law establish that an international fiduciary duty
exists, the full extent of the duty has yet to be defined. 319 General

314. See FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 235.
315. Id. at 234.
316. Id. at 236 (citing U.N. GAOR, 61st mtg. at 1278, U.N. Doc. A/315 (1946)
(statement of Mr. Navikov [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics])).
317. Id. (citing U.N. GAOR, 61st mtg. at 1269, U.N. Doc. A/315 (1946) (statement
of Mr. Thomas [United Kingdom])).
318. Id. (citing U.N. GAOR, 61st mtg. at 1284, U.N. Doc. A/315 (1946) (statement
of Mr. Bartos [Yugoslavia])).
319. The resolution of Nauru's claim requires clarification of the legal standard against
which to judge Australia's administration of the phosphate industry and its provisions for
rehabilitation of the central plateau. Applying general principles of law, on which Nauru's
claim is partly based, will help the court "to fill the gaps in the interpretation of the
trusteeship agreement under customary international law." FitzGerald, supra note 7, at

237.
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principles of law can provide some assistance in this regard. Article
38(I)(c) of the Statute of the Court allows the court to consider "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" in resolving disputes.320
Such rules arise from the parallel observance of legal norms by the nations
of the world. Thus, the trust can be described as a general principle of
law because it is recognized and accepted by the major legal systems of
the world, not just the common law. The civil law, customary systems,
and the major religious systems all recognize the fiduciary duty of a
trustee and accord it much weight.
In the civil law, for instance, the mandatum provides that a mandatory
entrusted with the goods of another is under a legal duty to account for his
custody of the goods in a faithful and honest manner.32' The mandatory
is not to benefit from the mandate, except where the contract provides
otherwise.322 Hindu law provides severe sanctions and punishments for
stealing communal wealth or violating the rules of a trust.3 23 Islamic law
imposes the duty upon the trustee not to take any profits or advantages
from the trust. The waqf (charitable trust) was such an important legal
arrangement that a department of state was established in most
jurisdictions to supervise the trustees.3 24 African customary law imposes
the obligations of a trustee on the tribal chief. The chief cannot sell, give
away, or otherwise dispose of any part of the tribal territory without the
approval of the public assembly.325 The chief is under a duty to take care
of the members of his tribe.326 Although the systems have differences,
there is a common thread that runs through them: administering the trust
in the best interests of the beneficiary and accountability for violating the
rules of the trust.
The presence of differences in systems does not, however, lessen the
force of the general principles asserted therein. Judge Christopher
Weeramantry writes
It does not follow that all the technical attributes these rules
carried in different legal systems would necessarily become part
of international law, but their broad essence is universal. It is
320. Statute of the Court, supra note 18, art. 38(1)(c).
321. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 151.
322. See id.
323. Id. at 152.

324. Id.
325. Id.

326. Id. at 151.
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that essence that was embodied in the concept of international
trusteeship.

327

This comparative view of the trust gives meaning to the terms used
by the drafters of the Trusteeship System. The trustee's duties of not
benefiting from the trust and avoiding conflicts of interest and duty
coupled with "the presumption against the trustee in relation to dealings
with the beneficiary, [and] the rules relating to fair-dealing" in part
comprise the well-recognized fiduciary duty.3 28

D. JudicialDecisions
Although judicial decisions are only a secondary means of determining
international law, such decisions provide good examples of the practical
application of the rules of international law. There have been a few cases
concerning the responsibility of an administering authority, although none

has dealt with the specific issues of Nauru v. Australia.3 29 One case,

which is strikingly similar on its facts, is Tito v. Waddell.3
Tito v. Waddell concerned a situation similar to that which occurred
on Nauru. The suit was brought by the inhabitants of Ocean Island, a
small island in the western Pacific Ocean. Unlike Nauru, Ocean Island
was held as a Protectorate of the Crown: there were no agreements or
mandates involved. However, the island's phosphate industry was
controlled by the same British Phosphate Commissioners as on Nauru. 33 '

The Commissioners engaged in mining activity similar to that on Nauru.
The Banabans332 brought suit in an English court claiming that the Crown

had breached its fiduciary obligations through a conflict between its duty
and its interest in the phosphate industry.333 This breach arose out of two
transactions in which a low royalty for the phosphate was fixed and in

327. Id. at 153.
328. Id.
329. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J.
Reports 128 (July 11).
330. 3 All E.R. 129 (1977) (Eng.).
331. The Commissioners bought the license to mine the phosphate deposits on Ocean

Island from the Pacific Islands Company. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 202-03.
332. The Banabans are the inhabitants of Ocean Island. Id. at 1.
333. See Tito, 3 All E.R. at 131.
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which the Commissioners acquired land on Ocean Island in terms not
favorable to the Banabans.334
In its decision, the court makes a distinction between a true trust-a
trust in the conventional sense-and a trust in the higher sense-a
government obligation. 33' The fiduciary obligation exists within the true
trust and not in the trust in the higher sense.33 6 In this case there was only
a trust in the higher sese, and hence no legal obliation of a fiduciary
nature on which to hinge liability. 337 The principle that emerges from Tito
v. Waddell is "that in the absence of an intention to create, or of an
implication of [the] creation of, a legal and justiciable fiduciary obligation,
there [is] no true trust," and hence no liability.338
Although the Ocean Island case was decided against the Banabans, it
is favorable to Nauru in that it shows a fiduciary duty can exist between
an administering authority and the territory. 339 This is possible if there is
The case of Nauru is one which, by its very
a "true trust."
terms-Trusteeship Agreement, United Nations Charter, and general
principles of law-is an express, or true trust. The International
Trusteeship System and Trusteeship Agreement were intended to create a
system of accountability on the part of trustees for administering the
economic assets of the inhabitants. 34 0 Even a municipal court would
recognize the obligations undertaken in the Trusteeship Agreement and
United Nations Charter, which formed the basis of Australia's right to
administer Nauru's economic assets.
Such is the situation in the United States and Canada. In the case of
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,34 ' Chief Justice Marshall of the United States

Supreme Court noted that Native Americans "are in a state of pupilage.
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian."342 This concept of a trust, and the resulting fiduciary duty,
continues to play an important role in the relationship between Native

334. See

WEERAMArrRY,

supra note 23, at 224.

335. See Tito, 3 All E.R. at 221.

336. See generally WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 224.
337. See Tito, 3 All E.R. at 237-38.

338.

WEERAMANTRY,

supra note 23, at 224.

339. The case was not a total loss for the Banabans. The court held that under the
principle of benefit and burden, the burden of rehabilitating sorme land would be placed

on the British Phosphate Commissioners. Id. at 222-23.
340. See generally id. at 224-25.
341.

30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).

342. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
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Americans and the United States.343

Similarly, the Canadian Supreme

Court has held that a fiduciary relationship exists with respect to the
manner in which the government managed the lands held for the benefit
of "native Canadians." 344 In commenting on the "fiduciary duty" in the
United States, a Canadian writer argues, "[d]uring the twentieth century
the American courts have applied trust principles in a wide variety of
situations to establish specific duties. The result has been to impose upon
the government obligations which are closely analogous to those of a
private fiduciary. ,345
E. The Extent of the FiduciaryDuty
At this point it is useful to draw some basic principles from the
international fiduciary duty. In order to determine if Australia has
breached its fiduciary duty with respect to Nauru, it is necessary to know
exactly what the duty entails. The following principles comprise the
fiduciary duty throughout the sources of international law referred to in
this section. 346 Therefore, they are applicable in the Nauru case, or in any
other situation where a fiduciary duty exists. It is important to keep in
mind that they are broad principles, and not technical rules peculiar to any
individual legal system. Furthermore, there can be little doubt that these
principles are part of general international law as mentioned in Article
38(l)(c) of the Statute of the Court.34 7

The principles can be briefly stated as follows:34
1. A duty to exercise diligence and prudence
An administering authority has custody and control of
The authority must administer
territory's "property."
property in the best interests of the beneficiary and with an
to the maximum long-term benefits of the beneficiary. In

the
the
eye
all,

343. See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMEKicAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW,
82-85 (1987).
344. See Guerin v. R., 2 S.C.R. 335 (1984) (Can.).
345. Darlene M. Johnson, A Theory of Crown Trust Towards Aboriginal Peoples, 18
OTrAWA L. REv. 307, 330 (1984).

346. These principles were formulated with specific reference to the Ocean Island case.
See Tito, 3 All E.R. at 241.
347. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 152-53.

348. Id. at 229.
SOLOMON

&

ALAN

This is otherwise known as the duty of care.
R. PALM1TER,

CORPORATIONS 295 (1990).

A STUDENT'S

GUIDE

TO

See LEwis D.
UNDERSTANDING
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this is a high standard of care imposed upon the administering
authority."

9

350
A duty to avoid a conflict between interest and duty
An administering authority should always avoid placing its own
interests in conflict with its 35
duty under the agreement.
3. A duty to avoid self-dealing '
The authority should not sell to itself any of the assets of the
territory.
352
4. A duty of fair-dealing
The territory can set aside a transaction unless the authority can
show that it has taken no advantage of its position, there was full
disclosure of the transaction, and the transaction was fair and
reasonable.
353
5. A duty to carry out the terms of the agreement
Equity requires that the3 administering
authority perform all the
54
agreement.
the
duties of
355
6. Liability for loss or damage
If the trustee causes loss or damage to a beneficiary by violating
a duty of the trusteeship, the loss or damage must be made good.

2.

V.

THE BREACH

The preceding discussion deals with the relatively simple question of
whether an international fiduciary duty exists; and if it does, what is its
extent? From an interpretation of the Trusteeship Agreement and the
United Nations Charter, there emerges a rule of international law that can
be called the fiduciary duty. Furthermore, under general rules of law and

349. Darlene Johnson writes, "[i]t is now unquestioned that government has a duty to
use reasonable care and skill in preserving tribal assets. Beyond this there is a duty to
make the trust property productive." Johnson, supra note 352, at 330.

350.

WEERAMANTRY,

supra note 23, at 227. This is otherwise known as the duty of

loyalty.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. As Judge Weeramantry writes, the authority is "as solemnly bound within the
terms of those documents as a trustee is by a deed or a will." Id. at 229. Infact, these
principles are even more applicable in the Nauru case because of the existence of factor
(5), which was absent in the Ocean Island case. That factor establishes "the intensity of
the fiduciary duty associated with the mandate and the trust." Id. at 230.
355. Id.
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the decision in Tito v. Waddell,356 the extent of that duty can be
determined. The more important question remains, however: Whether
Australia has breached its fiduciary duty with respect to the Nauru
Trusteeship?
There is ample evidence to support the contention that Australia has
breached its fiduciary duty under the Trusteeship Agreement.357 The most
glaring breach is of the obligation not to create a conflict of duty and
interest. Australia placed itself in such a conflict through the Nauru Island
Agreement and all of the economic, legislative, and administrative
arrangements that followed therefrom.358
The conflict arose out of the structure of the Phosphate Industry under
the Nauru Island Agreement. First of all, the British Phosphate
Commissioners was given exclusive control over the phosphate deposits.
It was given the power to acquire land almost at will, with little
consideration for the Nauruan people's rights. 359 Further, it was required
to sell phosphate to the three governments at the cost of extraction. By
giving control of the phosphate deposits to the Commissioners and keeping
the phosphate's price fixed near its extraction cost and well below market
price, Australia deprived Nauru of much of the benefit of its own natural
resources.36 The real benefit of the phosphate industry went to the
agricultural sectors of each administering authority in the form of a price
for phosphate well below that of the market.36' It is contrary to the basic
principles of the fiduciary relationship for the administering authority to
seek benefit under the arrangement, while at the same time depriving the
beneficiaries of potential proceeds from their economic assets.362

356. 3 All E.R. 129 (1977) (Eng.).
357. The presentation in this section is somewhat biased. The only documents which
were available were the Nauru Application and the ICJ decision, as well as secondary
sources of information. Nauru's Memorial is unavailable and the Counter-Memorial has
yet to be filed.
358. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 404. Australia breached its fiduciary duty

even before the Trusteeship was established. This is because Australia, New Zealand, and
the U.K. were motivated "to obtain the mandate over Nauru for the sake of obtaining
control over its phosphates rather than for any purpose connected with the advantage to
the Nauruan people. Statements to that effect were made ... in each of the three
countries concerned," and the documents on the issue confirm that as well. Id.
359. See id. at 405.
360. See Nauru Application, supra note 5, at 14.
361. See id. at 12, 14.
362. This breach is exacerbated by the fact that the Nauruan people were not
adequately consulted regarding the value of their economic resources or of the agreements
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Australia argues that the Nauruan people have benefited greatly from
the Trusteeship. It achieved a level of society that is enviable among the
developing nations of the world. As a result of Australia's tutelage,
Nauru has made great advancements in its medical services, education,
standard of living, and more. There is a high degree of literacy and little
hunger or relative poverty. In all, Australia has assisted Nauru in
transforming its society into one of the twenty-first century and has not
breached its fiduciary duty.363 While the factual elements of this argument
are true, it is not persuasive. The fiduciary duty is very high, and merely
providing a benefit under the relationship is not enough. A fiduciary is
under the obligation to place the beneficiary's interests first and to exclude
all other interests. 36' By taking Nauru's phosphates for cost and giving
little in return, Australia was placing its interests above those of Nauru in
clear violation of its fiduciary duty.
A second example of Australia's breach of the fiduciary duty lies in
its failure to exercise diligence and prudence in administering the
economic assets of Nauru, or, in other words, its failure to exercise due
care. This can be seea in different ways, each of which is enough by
itself to violate the fiduciary duty. 365 For example, Australia was aware
at an early date that the land would need to be rehabilitated. 36 However,
it continued to allow the Commissioners to mine the phosphate at an
accelerated rate.3 67 Further, no provision was made for rehabilitating the
land. This was done with the knowledge that such conduct would deprive
the Nauruans of the future use and enjoyment of their land. At the very
least, Nauruans would be responsible for rehabilitating the land
themselves. In any event, such action can only be seen as violating the
fiduciary duty as the authority should return the assets in an equal or
better condition. A fiduciary is under the obligation to administer assets
in the best long-term interests of the beneficiary. Allowing the only
economic asset of a small island to be mined to the point of near depletion
without providing for that asset's rehabilitation cannot be viewed as

they were entering into. One of the most basic rules of a fiduciary relationship is that the
beneficiary is consulted before entering into a transaction. Here there was little, and often
no, consultation with the Natiruans, which is a violation of the fiduciary duty. See id. at
16-18.
363. FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 226-27.
364. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 237, at 625.
365. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 402-11.

366. See Nauru Application, supra note 5, at 18.
367. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 405.
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conforming with the best long-term interest of the island's inhabitants. 368
Therefore, Australia has breached this aspect of its fiduciary duty.
There can be no doubt that Australia violated the fiduciary principle
of avoiding self-dealing. As stated earlier, someone in a fiduciary capacity
should not sell to itself any of the assets of the trust or seek to benefit
therefrom.3 69 Here, Australia was a purchaser of the only export item of
Nauru,37° phosphate, and benefited greatly under the Trusteeship
Agreement. Australia was part of the monopoly in respect of Nauruan
phosphate. All that was produced by the Commissioners was available to
the three governments. 37 And, again, the price was roughly the cost of
extraction. Finally, any profits due to excess production sold on the world
market were retained on account for the three authorities.372 In no way
could this be considered proper fiduciary conduct. As the profits and
advantages derived from a trusteeship are held in trust, they should be
made available for the rehabilitation effort. 3
Perhaps the most egregious violation of fiduciary principles is in
Australia's breach of the duty of fair dealing. Fiduciaries can conduct
transactions with their beneficiaries; however, such transactions are
carefully scrutinized. Only after there has been full disclosure of all
relevant facts, and if the fiduciary has not taken advantage of its position,
will a transaction be allowed. Also, the transaction must be fair and
reasonable.374 None of this can be said of the agreements arising out of
the phosphate industry on Nauru. The three nations withheld material
information concerning the phosphate industry without which the Nauruans
could not give full and fair consent to the royalties.375 Moreover, at no
time prior to 1964 were the Nauruans given independent advice concerning
the phosphate industry on their island. 376 Further, Australia took
368. In fact, at the request of the British Phosphate Commissioners, Australia allowed
the Commissioners to excavate phosphate below a depth of 20 feet. The 20 foot limit had
been recommended by Administrator Griffiths of Nauru. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note
23, at 405.

369. See FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 244.
370. 25 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 24, at 282.
371. FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 224 n.62.

372. Keith Higher et al, Case Review, 87 A.J.I.L. 282 (1993) (reviewing Certain
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, 1992 I.C.J. Rep.
240)

373. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 284.
374. See FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 244.
375. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 242.
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advantage of its position as administering authority to compel Nauru to
agree to the proposed royalties. 3" Finally, in no way could the phosphate
situation be considered fair and reasonable. In all, it can be seen that
Australia took advantage of its position as administering authority and
violated the fiduciary principle of fair dealing.
Additionally, Australia breached its fiduciary duty in not fulfilling the
terms of the Trusteeship Agreement. According to the Trusteeship
Agreement, Australia was responsible for administering Nauru in
accordance with the United Nations Charter and Trusteeship System.37 8
That entails promoting the economic, social, and cultural advancement of
the inhabitants of Nauru to the utmost.3 79 Australia's conduct under the

Agreement cannot be seen as accomplishing the basic objectives of the
Trusteeship System. By leaving the phosphate deposits in a depleted
condition and the land in an inhabitable condition, 80 Australia was not
promoting the economic well-being of the inhabitants of Nauru to the
utmost. Through its action, Australia has violated the express provisions
of the Trusteeship Agreement, which is a breach of its fiduciary duty.3"'
Although the foregoing is a very brief analysis of the subject, it seems
as if Australia has breached every aspect of the fiduciary duty it owed to
the people of Nauru. While Australia was a relatively good "trustee" and
left Nauru with a relatively well-developed infrastructure,382 it was not the
model administering authority. Nauru's environment and economy has
been significantly impaired because of Australia's actions with regard to
the phosphate industry.3 83 Therefore, in keeping with the principles of the
fiduciary duty, namely, liability for loss or damages arising out of a
violation of the trust, Australia has a duty to rehabilitate those parts of the
island that were mined under its administration.
V1. CONCLUSION

An analysis of the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship
Agreement for the Territory of Nauru reveals that an international
fiduciary duty does indeed exist. The duty emerges from the principles

377. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 23, at 285.

378.
379.
380.
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Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3.
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Field, supra note 249.
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382. FitzGerald, supra note 7, at 226-27.
383. Id. at 222-26.
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expressed in the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories
and the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System.384 The duty is created
by placing the interests of the inhabitants first and calling for the
administering authority to promote the inhabitants' economic, political, and
social advancement to the utmost. The fiduciary duty is reinforced even
further by customary international law.
General principles of law serve to better define the fiduciary duty. A
review of the institution of the trust in the various legal systems of the
world illuminates the extent of the international fiduciary duty. At the
very least, the fiduciary duty demands that the administering authority act
in a way calculated to serve the best long-term political, social, and
economic interests of the indigenous people, and leave the nation with a
developed infrastructure and productive environment for the future.
However, the fiduciary duty is not a technical rule, but a broad principle
that is based on trust and confidence.
In the case of Nauru, it is evident that Australia breached its fiduciary
duty. The Nauru Island Agreement alone is evidence of a conflict of
interest and duty. Also, the accelerated mining in the face of eminent
depletion and inevitable rehabilitation provides evidence of the breach of
the duty of diligence and prudence. Moreover, Australia's creation of a
monopolistic situation with respect to the phosphate violated the rule that
a fiduciary should avoid self-dealing and benefiting from the relationship.
Finally, the facts surrounding the negotiation of royalty rates evidence
Australia's breach of the duty of fair dealing. It therefore seems likely
that the ICJ would have held Australia liable for rehabilitating the
phosphate lands.
Had the case been decided on its merits, it would have had far
reaching implications for the rest of the world. Any former administering
authority would have been vulnerable to such a suit. In particular, the
United States could have been vulnerable to claims from the Pacific Island
territories.385 The United States has used some of these islands as
chemical weapons dumps, target ranges, and as nuclear test cites, e.g.,
Bikini Atoll. The Bikini Islanders, or some other group, might possibly
bring suit against the United States for breach of its fiduciary duty. 3 86 In
fact, even though Nauru v. Australia was settled, it may still have far-
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reaching implications. There have been rumors that many former trust
territories are in the process of evaluating their claims, and chances for
success, against their former administering authorities.38 7

387. Id.

